Sunni Vs Shia –
Who, What, Where, Why and When


I started this search with the question of who is more dangerous and violent, the Sunni or the Shia? Not surprisingly, I found very contradictory information, especially when the Comment section included statements from Islamic individuals. Both groups equally charge the other as being more violent, and likewise with the supposedly unbiased articles by outsiders. Their conclusions also differ.

From my personal viewpoint any religious group that takes up arms against another or against secular/Western viewpoints is dangerous. During British history the aggressor was sometimes the Catholics and sometimes the Protestants, but both killed many members of the opposite group. That's why I want the US to remain very rigidly and strictly “secular” in its government, rather than espousing any religious affiliation. The Western world has fought that religious war already, and we don't need to go back to it.

The “Gotquestion” website claims that the Shia are by far the most violent, and the Israeli scholar Michael Oren agrees, saying that the Sunni are by far the lesser of the two evils. A list of groups including Al-Qaeda, Hammas and the Muslim Brotherhood are Sunni. Hezbollah is Shia. See http://www.shiachat.com/forum/topic/235017329-list-of-sunni-extremist-terrorist-groups/, which also mentions the Wahhabi groups of Saudi Arabia, and recommends for further reading the US list of terrorist groups at http://m.state.gov/md123085.htm.

See also the Wikipedia article called “Wahhabism.” According to Wikipedia adherants of this sect consider the term Wahhabism to be derogatory and prefer :Salafi ormuwahhid.[13][14][15] The following is from that article.

“Karen Armstrong states that Osama bin Laden, like most extremists, followed the ideology of Sayyid Qutb, not "Wahhabism".[309] More recently the self-declared "Islamic State" in Iraq and Syria headed by Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi has been described as both more violent than al-Qaeda and more closely aligned with Wahhabism. For their guiding principles, the leaders of the Islamic State, also known as ISIS or ISIL, are open and clear about their almost exclusive commitment to the Wahhabi movement of Sunni Islam. The group circulates images of Wahhabi religious textbooks from Saudi Arabia in the schools it controls. Videos from the group's territory have shown Wahhabi texts plastered on the sides of an official missionary van.[310] According to scholar Bernard Haykel, "for Al Qaeda, violence is a means to an ends; for ISIS, it is an end in itself." Wahhabism is the Islamic States "closest religious cognate."[310]”

In short, there is militancy in all major groups of Islam. Currently ISIS is the most active and possibly the most dangerous in that violence is “an end in itself.” They are also attempting to form a separate nation for themselves out of Iraqi and Syrian territory. Wahhabism is not per se always violent, but it is a part of the puritanism that is sweeping the Islamic world today.






http://www.gotquestions.org/Shia-Sunni-Islam.html

Shia and Sunni Islam - what are the differences?

Question: "Shia and Sunni Islam - what are the differences?"

Answer:The main difference between Sunnis and Shias lies in their interpretation of the rightful succession of leadership after the death of the prophet Muhammad. The declaration of faith to which all Muslims assent is this: There is no God but Allah, whose prophet is Muhammad. However, the Shiites add an extra phrase at the end: and Ali is the friend of God. Because the Shiites passionately attest to Ali being the successor to Muhammad, much feuding and division have been caused in the world of Islam, not unlike the feuding between Protestants and Roman Catholics in Europe during the Reformation. However, the schism that sets up the major sects of Islam is not due to doctrinal issues, as between Protestants and Catholics, but is grounded in the identity of the “true successor” to Muhammad.

Among the close disciples of Muhammad was Ali, his son-in-law, who was most familiar with his teachings. However, when Muhammad died in A.D. 632, the followers bypassed Ali, whom the Shiites claim as the rightful successor to Muhammad. Instead, a cousin of Muhammad’s third successor, Uthman (A.D. 644-656), called Mu’awiya Umayyad, declared himself caliph. When he died in A.D. 680, his son Yazid usurped the caliphate instead of Ali’s youngest son, Hussein. The feud between rightful successors or caliphs was fought at the battle of Karbala. Hussein was slain, but his sole son, Ali, survived and continued the line of succession. Yazid, however, gave rise to the Ummayad line of succession, from which modern-day Sunnism arose.

As for their beliefs, both Sunni and Shia Muslims agree on the five pillars of Islam. While the Sunnites honor Ali, they do not venerate their imams as having the gift of divine intercession. Sunnites conduct community prayers and believe they can have a direct relationship with God. Of the two, Shiite Muslims have a burning desire to engage in martyrdom and believe that suffering is a means of spiritual cleansing. They dwell on the martyrdoms of Ali and Hussein, especially over the ten-day period of Ashura. Also noteworthy is the veneration that Shiites give to the imams, believing they are endowed with infallibility in their interpretation of the Qur’an. In many ways, this mirrors the way the pope is venerated in Rome.

In terms of actual practice, the Sunni Muslims pray five times a day: thefajr, thezohr, theasar, themaghriband finally theisha(“darkness”). Shia Muslims only pray three times—morning, lunchtime and sunset. Another important difference between the two sects is that Shia Muslims permit fixed-term temporary marriage, known asmuttah.Muttahwas originally permitted at the time of the Prophet and is now being promoted in Iran by an unlikely alliance of conservative clerics and feminists, the latter group seeking to downplay the obsession with female virginity which is prevalent in both forms of Islam, pointing out that only one of the Prophet's thirteen wives was a virgin when he married her.

Iran is overwhelmingly Shia - 89 percent. Shia Muslims also form a majority of the population of Yemen, Azerbaijan, Bahrain and 60 percent of the population of Iraq. There are also sizeable Shia communities along the east coast of Saudi Arabia and in Lebanon. The well-known guerrilla organization Hezbollah, which forced the Israelis out of southern Lebanon in 2000, is Shia. Worldwide, Shias constitute 10 to 15 percent of the overall Muslim population, but they make up the majority of the radical, violent element of Islam.

Read more: http://www.gotquestions.org/Shia-Sunni-Islam.html#ixzz3PHLos6Sj



~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~




http://rubinreports.blogspot.com/2013/05/whos-more-dangerous-sunni-or-shia.html

Who's More Dangerous: Sunni Or Shia Islamists?
By Barry Rubin
May 17, 2013

There is a passionate, but somewhat academic debate, over the following issue: Which is the greater threat, the Sunni Muslim Islamists (Egypt, Tunisia, Gaza Strip, and perhaps soon to be Syria) or the Shia Muslim Islamists (Iran, Lebanon, at the moment still Syria)?

I would say the answer would be the Iran-led Shia bloc. But two reservations: the margin isn’t that big and it also depends on the specific place and situation.

To begin with, Iran is still the greatest strategic threat in the region. It is moving as fast as it can toward nuclear weapons and it is still the main sponsor of terrorism. At the moment, it is still, too, the most likely state that would initiate an anti-Western war, though that possibility is smaller than often believed. It has lots of money.

What has gone largely unnoticed is that it is almost the middle of 2013 and the Obama Administration has barely begun negotiations with Iran that will probably drag on without success for a year or more. In addition, after Iran’s June elections, which will presumably pick a radical who is less obviously extremist than current President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, the U.S. government and mass media will probably proclaim a new era of Iranian moderation.

Iran is also the main backer of Islamist revolution in Bahrain (where it has failed); Lebanon (where its Hizballah clients are the strongest force); and Syria (where its regime ally is in serious trouble).

One final point is that Tehran is having some success in drawing the Iraqi (Shia) government into its orbit. Baghdad is certainly cooperating with Iran on defending the Syrian regime, though one should not exaggerate how much Iraq is in Iran’s pocket. At any rate, nobody would want the Iraqi regime to be overthrown by the al-Qaida terrorist opposition.

So a strong case can be made that Iran is the greatest threat in the region.

On the other hand, however, a Great Wall of Sunnism has been built to prevent the extension of Iranian influence except for Lebanon. The Sunni bloc contains few Shia Muslims. The Muslim Brotherhood, the even more radical Salafists, and other Sunni Muslims (Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, and the United Arab Emirates, for example) have said that the Shias are a worse threat than Israel.

Perhaps the fear of Iran provides some common cause with the West. But this is also a scary proposition since the Obama Administration’s promotion of Sunni Islamism (Egypt, Tunisia, Syria, and even Turkey) could use this point as an excuse. Perhaps America could be said to be building a united front against Iran but at what price? Turning over much of the Arab world to repressive, anti-American, and antisemitic Sunni Islamism as Christians flee?

There is also another weakness of Sunni Islamism, however, that also makes it seem relatively less threatening. In contrast to Iran, the Sunni Islamists do not have a wealthy patron comparable to Iran. They can depend on money from Qatar and to some extent from Libya but they have fewer resources. Sometimes the Saudis will help Sunni Islamists but only if they tone down their warlike and anti-Western actions. There is no big banker for Sunni Islamist destabilization of the Middle East.

Equally, they do not have a reliable source of arms, in contrast to the Shia who have Iran and also at times Russia. True, in Syria the Sunni rebels have U.S. backing to get weaponry and arms from Libya and elsewhere paid for by Saudi Arabia and Qatar. Yet Syria is an exceptional case. The Saudis are not going to finance the Muslim Brotherhood and its ambitions. Bahrain has declared Shia Hizballah to be a terrorist group even while the European Union refuses to do so.

So arguably one could say that the Shia Islamists and Iran are a bigger danger. But a second danger is a U.S. or Western policy to promote Sunni Islamism as a way to counter the Shia, a strategy that has intensified regional dangers and the suffering of Arab peoples. Then, too, there’s the fact that al-Qaida is a Sunni Islamist organization, and the al-Qaida forces are getting stronger in Syria.

One would have to be very foolish to want  to see Sunni Islamism make further gains, to overthrow the monarchies in Morocco, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Oman, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, or Bahrain, as well as the Algerian regime. One would also have to be foolish--but here the Obama Administration is so--to want to see Muslim Brotherhood regimes succeed in Egypt, Tunisia, the Gaza Strip, and Syria.

What we are seeing, however, is that Islamism is becoming entangled at present with the power it has gained, especially in Egypt. The country is innately in economic difficulties and these are being intensified by Muslim Brotherhood misrule. Rather than raise their countries to the peak of military-economic efficiency, the Islamist regimes are wrecking them.

But there are some very significant wild cards in the deck:

--If Sunni Islamist regimes in Egypt and Syria face significant problems with instability and economics, they might adopt the time-honored, traditional tactic of Arab dictatorships by stirring up foreign quarrels and promoting anti-Americanism. This could unleash future Arab-Israeli wars.

--Sunni Islamist regimes in Egypt, the Gaza Strip, and probably Syria would give extremely radical Salafist forces a free hand in attacking Christians, moderates, women’s rights, foreign embassies, and possibly Israel. Human rights in these countries—if anybody in the West cares about that—are going to suffer severe hits.

--Hamas will probably attack Israel in future, perhaps with at least some Egyptian backing though the Egyptian regime is now trying to restrain Hamas in order to consolidate rule at home and get Western money.

--Al-Qaida is gaining strength in Syria and for the first time its possible takeover cannot be ruled out, at least in alliance with other Salafist groups.

--The stronger the Sunni Islamists the more uncooperative the Palestinian Authority (PA) will be with attempts at a “peace process.” It is possible that the PA would face a considerable challenge from Hamas on the West Bank while forces within Fatah, the PA’s ruling party, might form alliances with Hamas. Israel should be able to keep the PA in power—a situation wrought with irony—but its stability could crumble.

In short, while one can make the case for Shia Islamism being the more dangerous—at least as long as Iran might get nuclear weapons—one must very carefully examine the implications of that judgment in every specific case. Promoting Sunni Islam is no panacea but rather substitutes longer-term for shorter-term threats.

This article is published on PJMedia.


Barry Rubin is director of the Global Research in International Affairs (GLORIA) Center and editor of the Middle East Review of International Affairs (MERIA) Journal. His next book, Nazis, Islamists and the Making of the Modern Middle East, written with Wolfgang G. Schwanitz, will be published by Yale University Press in January 2014. His latest book is Israel: An Introduction, also published by Yale. Thirteen of his books can be read and downloaded for free at the website of the GLORIA Center including The Arab States and the Palestine Conflict, The Long War for Freedom: The Arab Struggle for Democracy in the Middle East and The Truth About Syria. His blog is Rubin Reports. His original articles are published at PJMedia.




~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~




http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2014/06/israels-former-ambassador-to-the-us-on-the-palestinian-question/373627/

Israel's Former Ambassador: Militant Shias Are More Dangerous Than Sunnis
CONOR FRIEDERSDORF
JUN 27 2014

Michael Oren made the provocative claim that "the lesser evil is the Sunnis over the Shias," while insisting that the U.S. should never ally with Iran, even against Sunni terrorists.

ASPEN, Colo.—Michael Oren, an American-born diplomat who served as Israel's ambassador to the United States, joked at the beginning of a Friday interview at the Aspen Ideas Festival that an ambassador isn't, as some would have it, an official sent abroad to lie for his country—an ambassador is someone sent abroad to lie for two countries. 

His interviewer, Jeffrey Goldberg, quipped that now that he's a private citizen, he can level with us, and then pressed him on a range of subjects, including Israeli construction projects in disputed territory, the danger of Israel losing the support of American Jews, how Israel thinks about the Iranian nuclear program, and more. His responses were at times more provocative than any made by acting diplomats.  

Most notably, he responded to a question about whether America should ally with Iran to fight Sunni terrorists in Iraq by insisting that, when it comes to militant Islam in the Middle East, even after the rise of ISIS, "the lesser evil is the Sunnis over the Shias." Sunnis may carry out suicide bombings and international terrorist attacks (as America learned on 9/11), but Shias from Tehran to Beirut wield far more hard military power and pose a much larger threat to Israel. "It's of a different magnitude entirely," he argued. "Do not make a pact with Iran."

With respect to Iraq, he argued that we saw the end of the Iraq-Syria border this week, and that the Sykes-Picot system of nation-states may be unraveling in the Middle East. 

On Israel's dispute with Palestine, Oren declared that his country was correct to unilaterally draw borders because Palestine was not yet ready to sign onto a "two-state solution." What I found more interesting was his account of what the unilaterally drawn border must achieve to be effective. In his view, Israel must be able to tell the Europeans, you may not like this, but it isn't worth imposing sanctions. Israel must be able to tell its own citizens, these are lines that we can send our kids out to defend. And the borders should, in his view, be disliked by Palestinians. "I think we have to draw a line that the Palestinians don't like. Because we want to leave the door open to a two-state solution. It may take a generation." Put another way, he believes Israel must build in concessions it can make during future negotiations, and (implicitly) that there is a tension between the fairness of present arrangements and game theory that maximizes the chance of long-term fairness. Logic of that sort could lend itself to rationalizing unfair arrangements.

With respect to the U.S., Oren argued that just as America is indispensable to Israel, insofar as we act as its "diplomatic shield" and military protector, so too is Israel indispensable to the United States, because they're our only real ally in the region, with a bigger military than the French and British combined.  Unfortunately, he illustrated his point with a trite example: that only in Israel can an American president give a speech as the audience cheers and waves American flags. So what? Many people believe Israel's hard power in the region is essential for America. I'd like to hear the frank reasoning for that controversial position. An audience for friendly speeches is not essential. What is the U.S. getting that is essential?

Finally, Oren made the provocative claim that the U.S. is even now engaged in military action in Iraq, and that America ought to be fighting there even though we're unlikely to change the facts on the ground! "America's not going to impact the outcome," he said. "But the fact that America is involved sends a message to people in China and Russia that America is not withdrawing from the world." He regards sending that signal as important to long-term U.S. interests. I've long taken the less counterintuitive position: that countries shouldn't put the lives of their soldiers in mortal danger, spend billions, and kill people in a foreign land for purposes of signaling, especially when they know going in that fighting won't help.




~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~




CONTRADICTORY INFORMATION: SUNNIS ARE MORE VIOLENT

Why are Sunni Muslims more violent than Shiite Muslims?

There was a recent report of the Taliban killing 9 tourists and 1 Pakistani guide in Pakistan. The area was once peaceful but violence against Shiite Muslims by Sunni Muslims is becoming more common. Why are all the violent Muslim groups Sunnis?


COMMENTS:

Nous – Two years ago – Both are equally violent it was never done by one side not only those Muslims but international game is also involved in this sectarian warfare see sunni countries supporting killings on Shia and shite countries supporting the killing of sunnis just for dollars and other self interests

Saghoo – Two Years Ago – Not all Sunnis and Shiites are violent. 
& Taliban members don't deserve to be called a Muslim. They're just a trouble maker.

? Unsigned – Two Years Ago – This is due to many many reasons. However, one core aspect is the difference in beliefs between Shia and Sunni Islam. These beliefs are taught by the teachers and leaders within those two groups and followed by its people. If you look at what MANY sunni imams (teachers) tell their followers you will notice how they call out for hate, violence, takfir and more. Of course not all sunnis are like that but the numbers of those that are is significant. 

On the other hand, the shia leaders (called marja') do not teach us anything like this. They teach us what the prophet (saw), the quran and the prophet's family (ahulbayt) have taught us. They teach us that you respect your fellow human, whether hes a sunni, a shi'i, a jew, a hindu, an atheist or whatever. In fact, what I learned from one of the marja' is that when a sunni enters your house and hurts you, you will not lay a finger on him unless out of self protection, due to the fact that he is your brother in Islam. While on the other hand Sunni leaders are creating fatwas which claim that it is halal and even rewarded to kill a shi'i. 

Recently, with the uprising of ISIS in Iraq, one of the shia scholars (Sayed Ayatollah Ali Al Sistani) called out for Shia muslims in Iraq to fight against ISIS but ONLY as protection of the cities and the people. It was the first time in roughly a THOUSAND years that a shi'i scholar calls out for jihad while in sunni Islam it is a daily matter. Are there no violent shia? Of course there are since we are talking about millions of people and a large group like that is impossible to fully control, but the numbers of rotten apples within Shia Islam are nothing compared to those within Sunni Islam. Boko Haram, Free syrian army, Al-nusra front, ISIS, Al qaida, Taliban, Al shabab etc etc etc. And many of those that haven't joined those groups directly, support them morally. Without realising it, Sunnis AS A GROUP (so not individually each on of them) are destroying Islam. ….

Ahmed – One month ago – Please read the history of Islam. Then you will get your answer there. Oh another thing, you should read history of Pakistan. Pakistani army killed 3 million Bengalis in 1971 and raped 500000 Bengali women! Most Bengali Muslims are Sunni Muslims though. And Shi'a Muslims in Iran kill Baha'i and other religious minorities like Christians, Jews, Zoroastarians etc.

Rami Alsebki – Two Years Ago – Prophetic Narrations 

The lives of the practitioners of other religions in the Muslim society was also given protective status. The Prophet (peace and blessings be upon him!) said: 

“Whoever kills a person who has a truce with the Muslims will never smell the fragrance of Paradise.” (Saheeh Muslim) 

Since the upper hand was with the Muslims, the Prophet strictly warned against any maltreatment of people of other faiths. He said: 

“Beware! Whoever is cruel and hard on a non-Muslim minority, or curtails their rights, or burdens them with more than they can bear, or takes anything from them against their free will; I (Prophet Muhammad) will complain against the person on the Day of Judgment.” (Abu Dawud) 



The teachings of the Prophet on how you and I should treat our Non-Muslim friends and neighbours on a day to day basis as well as how to government should treat a Non-Muslim citizen of a Muslim state. 

"He who believes in God and the Last Day should honour his guest, should not harm his neighbour, should speak good or keep quiet." (Bukhari, Muslim) 

"Whoever hurts a Non-Muslim citizen of a Muslim state hurts me, and he who hurts me annoys God." (Bukhari) 

"He who hurts a Non-Muslim citizen of a Muslim state, I am his adversary, and I shall be his adversary on the Day of a Judgement." (Bukhari)  .There are many other proofs that what they are doing is wrong. All these killings are from ignorance and lack of islamic knowledge.

Should a distinction be made between violent and non-violent Muslims?

 Best Answer: It's not a Sunni/Shiite thing, as far as the violence is concerned. There are extremists in both sects, and peaceful people in both sects, just like there are Christians who bomb abortion clinics as well as Christians who participate in post-disaster clean-up. Typically, what happens is that one group or the...:
answers · Religion & Spirituality




~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~




http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shia%E2%80%93Sunni_relations

Sunni-Shia Relations
Wikipedia.com

---

1919-1970[edit]

At least one scholar sees the period from the collapse of the Ottoman Empire through the decline of Arab nationalismas a time of relative unity and harmony between traditionalist Sunni and Shia Muslims—unity brought on by a feeling of being under siege from a common threat, secularism, first of the European colonial variety and then Arab nationalist.[7]

A remarkable example of Sunni–Shia cooperation was the Khilafat Movement which swept South Asia following the defeat of the Ottoman Empire, the seat of the Caliphate, in World War I. Shia scholars "came to the caliphate's defence" by attending the 1931 Caliphate Conference in Jerusalem. This was despite the fact they were theologically opposed to the idea that non-Imams could be Caliphs or successors to Muhammad, and that the Caliphate was "the flagship institution" of Sunni, not Shia, authority. This has been described as unity of traditionalists in the face of the twin threats of "secularism and colonialism."[7]

Another example of unity was a fatwā issued by the rector of Al-Azhar University, Mahmud Shaltut, recognizing Shia Islamic law as the fifth school of Islamic law. In 1959, al-Azhar University in Cairo, the most influential center of Sunni learning, authorized the teaching of courses of Shia jurisprudence as part of its curriculum.[69]

Post-1980[edit]

Following this period, Sunni–Shia strife has seen a major upturn, particularly in Iraq and Pakistan. Many explain the bloodshed as the work of conspiracies by extremist forces—"the forces of hegemony and Zionism which aim to weaken [Arabs]" (Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani and Yusuf al-Qaradawi),[70] unspecified "enemies" (Iran president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad),[71] or American neo-liberals who wish to provoke "a debilitating Islam civil war." (Dilip Hiro).[72]

Others lay the blame for the strife at a very different source, the unintended effects of the Islamic revival. According to scholar Vali Nasr, as the Muslim world was decolonialised and Arab nationalism lost its appeal, fundamentalism blossomed and reasserted the differences and conflicts between the two movements, particularly in the strict teachings of Sunni scholar Ibn Taymiyyah.[73] The Iranian Islamic revolution changed the Shia–Sunni power equation in Muslim countries "from Lebanon to India" arousing the traditionally subservient Shia to the alarm of traditionally dominant and very non-revolutionary Sunni.[74] "Where Iranian revolutionaries saw Islamic revolutionary stirrings, Sunnis saw mostly Shia mischief and a threat to Sunni predominance."[75]

Although the Iranian revolution's leader, Ayatollah Khomeini, was very much in favor of Shia–Sunni unity, he also challenged Saudi Arabia, in his view an "unpopular and corrupt dictatorship" and an "American lackey" ripe for revolution. In part because Saudi Arabia was the world's major international funder of Islamic schools, scholarships, fellowships, etc., this angered not only Saudi Arabia but its many fundamentalist allies and benefactors throughout the Arab world.[76]

Olivier Roy, research director at the French National Centre for Scientific Research, sees the "Shia awakening and its instrumentalisation by Iran" as leading to a "very violent Sunni reaction", starting first in Pakistan before spreading to "the rest of the Muslim world, without necessarily being as violent." According to Roy, "two events created a sea change in the balance of power between Shia and Sunnis: the Islamic revolution in Iran and the American military intervention in Iraq" in 2003. "Today, Azerbaijan is probably the only country where there are still mixed mosques and Shia and Sunnis pray together."[77]

….

Saudi Sunni[edit]

A large fraction of the foreign Sunni extremists who have entered Iraq to fight against Shia and the American occupation are thought to be Saudis. According to one estimate, of the approximately 1,200 foreign fighters captured in Syria between summer 2003 and summer 2005, 85% were Saudis.[107]

Another reflection of grassroots Wahhabi or Saudi antipathy to Shia was a statement by Saudi cleric Nasir al-Umar, who accused Iraqi Shias of close ties to the United States and argued that both were enemies of Muslims everywhere.[185]

Al-Qaeda[edit]

Some Wahabi groups, often labeled [by whom?] as takfiri and sometimes linked[by whom?] to Al-Qaeda, have even advocated the persecution of the Shia as heretics.[186][187] Such groups have been allegedly responsible for violent attacks and suicide bombings at Shi'a gatherings at mosques and shrines, most notably in Iraq during the Ashura mourning ceremonies where hundreds of Shias were killed in coordinated suicide bombings,[188][189][190] but also in Pakistan and Afghanistan. However, in a video message, Al-Qaeda deputy Dr Ayman al-Zawahiri directed Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, of Al-Qaeda in Iraq, not to attack civilian targets but to focus on the occupation troops. His call seems to have been ignored, or swept away in the increasing tensions of Iraq under occupation.

United States[edit]

In late 2006 or early 2007, in what journalist Seymour Hersh called The Redirection, the United States changed its policy in the Muslim world, shifting its support from the Shia to the Sunni, with the goal of "containing" Iran and as a by-product bolstering Sunni extremist groups.[191] Richard Engel, who is an NBC News Chief Foreign Correspondent, wrote an article in late 2011 alleging that the United States Government is pro-Sunni and anti-Shia. During the Iraq War, the United States feared that a Shiite-led, Iran-friendly Iraq could have major consequences for American national security. However, nothing can be done about this as Iraq's Shiite government were democratically elected.[192] Shadi Bushra of Stanford University wrote that the United States’ support of the Sunni monarchy during the Bahraini uprising is the latest in a long history of US support to keep the Shiites in check. The United States fears that Shiite rule in the Gulf will lead to anti-US and anti-Western sentiment as well as Iranian influence in the Arab majority states.[193]